"His parents must not have hugged him enough as a child." This is a common expression that many people use when describing someone with a gruff exterior, a bully, or someone who is just being rude. How does this expression work? What does a hug have to do with the reason that guy just cut in front of an elderly person? When someone uses this expression, they are trying to say that because the person did not receive enough attention or affection from their parents during their adolescent years, the person did not become a fully developed socialized adult and therefore instead takes anger and frustration out on others. Without even knowing the factors that led to anger in that person’s life, other people are ready to make a psychological conclusion about the person’s childhood. How much responsibility is generally placed on parents for the outcome of their children?

This relationship of parent-child is similar to the relationship between an underdeveloped or war-torn nation and an outside nation who is overseeing the rebuilding of that country. Of course, no one says:
“Iraq’s parents should have hugged him more.” But isn’t that true? Are the conditions that Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Haiti etc. faced in the past any different than the deadbeat parent? How many similarities connect the angry person on the street corner with unstable Afghanistan? Is the goal of the United States in intervening in other countries to become the ‘good’ parent? In both instances the goal is to raise the child into maturity so the child is no longer dependent on the relationship with the parents. This is known as the “18 Effect” in nation-building: trying to determine the necessary length for occupation and measures for maturity in nation-building attempts.

**Overview**

The purpose of this paper is to examine several instances of United States nation-building and determine which factors led to success or failure in the operation. The strategy of “The 18 Effect” in nation-building will be introduced as an explanatory factor for the success or failure of nation-building attempts based around the timing of the completion of four foundations of successful nation-building. Indicating factors of success will be measured, such as democracy measuring scores, military and civilian casualty totals, and economic growth. These measures will be applied to several countries that the U.S. has intervened with in each case. The following cases will be used: Iraq from 2003 to the present, Afghanistan from 2001 to the present, Haiti from 1994 to 2000, and Japan and Germany from 1945 to 1965. Understanding these measures of success will determine whether or not the theory of “The 18 Effect” has any validity for future studies in nation-building and deciding what constitutes the proper amount of attention and parenting style the U.S. would need to undertake in other nation-building attempts.

**Nation-Building**

The use of the term “nation-building” is rightly juxtaposed with outer states and nations intervening in troubled states before, during, and after conflict. The common perception of nation-building is usually the ‘big brother’ state aiding, assisting, or imposing their will upon the smaller nation during regime change or economic or social calamities. This perception is better stated as state-building (Fukuyama 2006). In actual nation-building, the “nation” or groups of people with common values and identities are often overlooked by the parenting country in exchange for an imposition of state-changing measures. Successful nation-building should not impose a single identity on a group in a divided nation. It should instead allow states to organize these groups to operate autonomously despite any differences (Ottaway 2002). There is a need for a balance in the understanding of proper nation-building for this to be successful.
Development vs. Reconstruction

First, there must be a determination of which type of nation-building is being used. According to American political economist and renowned author Francis Fukuyama, the two types of nation-building consist of reconstruction and development (Fukuyama 2006). Reconstruction is based around returning the troubled state to their previous conditions involving most forms of state structure. Developmental nation-building is used when an intervening state changes the structure of the struggling state and dissolves former institutions and governing principles (Fukuyama 2006). In a hypothetical example, if Iran were to dissolve the Iranian government due to political or economic crises in the near future and the United States stepped in and helped build their economy and infrastructure, returning the old system of governance and bringing back Amhadinejad, that would be an example of reconstruction. If the U.S. intervened and restructured the entire government, creating a new entity, this would be an example of development. These models are two different parenting strategies used by the U.S. in intervention. In determining the success or failure of nation-building it is essential to compare the two styles to decide which has the least resistance for change, making it easier for success.

The 18 Effect

The theory of the “18 Effect” in nation-building is based around the allegory of the parent/adolescent relationship. “18” is the perceived age of maturity in children when they are ready to govern themselves and parental guidance is no longer necessary. In the most common sociological and biological construct of parenting in human beings, parents conceive and give birth to their children, making them responsible for care and upbringing until the child reaches an age of maturity. In Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, food & shelter, safety, love, esteem & proper social interaction are steps towards maturity. All of these provisions must be met with some sort of funding that the parents work to achieve in bringing the child through adolescence. If one of these four foundations is not met then the child will not reach full physical or mental maturity. The purpose of maturation in child raising is to have the child reach a level of maturity strong enough that the parent no longer has the responsibility to provide for any of the four foundations and the child can self-provide as well as promote maturity in any other children that it may one day produce. This all may seem to be common knowledge but it is important to revisit in order to apply it to success in nation-building.

What really happens to children whose parents do not provide a
proper balance of the four foundations for maturity? It is not a secret that not all children who leave their homes are mature adults. The cases to look at here are broken homes. How are children who leave their families before maturity comparable to the U.S. withdrawing from a country before that country is ready to self-govern? The biggest needs to be met for children in broken homes are shelter, education, and social interaction. Often times one or more parents are away from home and cannot provide the attention necessary for the child to mature. This parent/child authority and devotion is similar to any case of international intervention. The child then tends to miss extended periods of schooling; they also may turn to gangs or violence when they feel it is unsafe to stay at home and appropriate to leave their house and are better off on the streets. This is an example of how deteriorating factors of success in child raising can lead to failure in maturity.

Too Little Attention

Likewise, if the United States is the parent and the country of intervention is the child, then the same tenants of maturity must be applied. The U.S. would need a full committal of resources in the occupation. This would include military troops to solve the problem of violence that the wayward child turns to for security in a broken home. If the child’s parents provide proper attention and discipline then the child will likely not turn to violence. If the parents are enforcing school attendance then education and social interaction will be sufficient enough to succeed after maturity. If the U.S. trains the country in ways of electoral democracies and liberal economics then the country should be prepared after intervention to govern itself and promote those ideals to other nations they have influence over. This paper will further explore cases where intervention did not last as long as it should because these foundations were not met and further examine the theory that shortened intervention leads to failure in nation-building.

Too Much Attention

So if not enough attention is a detriment to success then does too much attention mean greater success? Not always. The other part to the “18 Effect” is that unnecessarily prolonged intervention stunts growth to a similar outcome of shortened intervention. For some parents, this realization may be a bit harder to swallow. A proper stereotypical example is the ‘socially awkward’ thirty year old who lives in their parent’s basement and spends the nights slamming Mountain Dew and playing World of Warcraft. Often times in these cases the child is fully educated and has proper shelter and physical conditioning. The problem with prolonged intervention in parenting is that it stunts the child’s socialization leading to a halted maturity. This child may not have a job or career or any intentions of earning one. The parent’s mindset may be that the best way to ensure success for the child they care for is to never let them out of their sight. Therefore if the child
were to suddenly be cast into the world of maturity and self-governance they would be unprepared. They would be unlikely to find a job and their social skill-set is likely at a place that they would not be able to advance in any job that would make them capable of supporting a family or shelter. This means that because they have not reached maturity they will not be able to inspire maturity in the lives of others. Because the child has not reached maturity by a late age, it would be irresponsible for the parents to cut them loose without preparation.

Are there examples of the United States parenting too long and causing a stunted maturation in the nation of intervention? At what point does American intervention become Americanization? This is the colony effect in parenting. The child begins to identify less with self-actualization and more with that of his parents. The child lives to fulfill the familial duties of their parents instead of their own children. In nation-building the constant occupation in the streets with soldiers in the intervening country cause the citizens of the occupied country to see it as less of help and more of a takeover and change of ideals. If a country takes over another country’s economic trade, occupies the country, and never relinquishes power to the occupied country then nation-building has not occurred and nation-colonization has. If this is the case and the intervening country suddenly leaves the occupied country, then the occupied country will not be any better prepared for self-governance than it was before the intervention. It will have to create it’s own abilities to manage its government and economy and is likely to return to it’s pre-intervention state. This effect can be seen during the Cold War and the influence of the USSR on the eastern bloc of Europe. This paper will further explore this example and decide whether or not this is a valid theory in relation to state building.

Parenting Strategy
In the previous example of the man who ‘needed a hug’ as a child, time and attention were indicators of the outcome of the man’s actions. The 18 Effect looks at time and attention as indicator for success or failure in nation-building. The other explanatory factor for parenting in the 18 Effect is strategy. Parents often use multiple strategies in raising their children that have different level of effectiveness. In this case the study will look at whether or not the strategy of reconstruction or development is an indicator of success. To fit the metaphor, hugging children is a strategy for showing attention, but spending time and vocalizing affection is a different strategy that might be just as effective.

Factors of Success and Failure
But what are these particular factors for success and failure? How can we define success from the standpoint of the country’s role? The
overwhelming goal in U.S. nation-building should be creating democratic, stable, sovereign states. Just as in parenting, the goal is to raise the children in the ways the parent considers successful, and then releasing children into the world to govern themselves. A citizen who respects others and is able to compete and cooperate in the world is clearly a success. Likewise we can equate this to nation-building. Regardless of the economic ideology, countries that are politically and militarily secure and economically stable are considered successful. Before coming to a consensus on the validity of the theory, it is necessary to intuitively conclude the status of success in American nation-building in several different cases. Since there is no definitive answer in the multiple paradigms of considering what international success is, it is important to value scholarly opinion of the experts who are deeply penetrating the topic. Then, it is possible to garner a lens through which to view the theory. This will ultimately aid in defining the variable for success in which to test a hypothesis from the theory of whether length on intervention plays the greatest role in success or failure in nation-building.

There are many indicators of a stabilized democracy. According to Larry Diamond, Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University, the four foundations for a legitimized government are political, economic, social, and security (Diamond 2006). These foundations interact with each other and are necessary for development. Much like the legs of a table, if one of these foundations is off, the table will become unstable and may fall. Including in those foundations are facilitative and constitutive factors for democracy including civic institutions, justice, rule of law, political parties, free and fair elections, government transparency, freedom of expression and press, and enumeration of rights, to name some of the most important (Etzioni 2004).

After reviewing many cases of American intervention it becomes clear as to how intervention length and style leads to maturity in nation-building. Before intervention should end, several of the facilitating factors must be met to meet the criteria of the four foundations of nation-building. In life, there are certain things a child needs, an education, the ability to work, and social interaction, with benchmarks along the way indicating success in these areas. It would also appear every child is not the same, and therein lies the problem in nation-building. It is important to look into each case of nation-building in determining what went right or wrong and when the appropriate time for maturity should occur.

Cases to be Analyzed

Iraq

First, a preliminary look at several cases of nation-building will be looked at before taking a closer look at the hypothesis. A great starting point for this study would be the case of Iraq starting in 2003. This case is
still being closely critiqued and for many it has become a shining example of a failure of developmental nation-building, and for others the book has yet to be written on whether or not success can flourish in Iraq. What are the factors that led to this conclusion? First, the overall ambition of the development process was the biggest the United States had faced since Germany and Japan (Dobbins et. al 2003). Iraq had already failed to become a cohesive nation-state. Iraq’s system had the form, but not the substance of a modern society (Rathmell 2005). The United States was unprepared in undertaking prewar preparations in Iraq because of the lack of support from the UN. This caused the mission to seem as leading a mission of U.S. imperialism (Dobbins et. al 2003). Iraq faced some of the most intimidating problems for the U.S. after the fall of Saddam. The U.S. had to construct a new state out of a decimated society and economy (Diamond 2006). In the midst of this, terrorists causing huge security concerns made police training the top priority for state-building.

Security became the one leg on the table that comes before any other, and the first few years it was clear the U.S. committed troop levels were not enough. It became extremely difficulty to provide security in a place in which the government was lacking legitimacy. Institutions set up in the capital, Baghdad, appeared to many of the citizens as an imperialistic takeover and many Iraqis grew to resent the occupation, which further added to the violence (Diamond 2006). Unlike the nation-building cases in Japan and Germany, where many ex-regime officials were job applicants, there were still many Saddam loyalists vying for power within the new government that the U.S. coalition did not expect to have to handle. Iraqis were faced with a new system of governing councils without education or experience of the Westernized democratic systems (Diamond 2006).

In the area of parenting strategy, the U.S. has employed a developmental strategy of nation-building in Iraq. The developmental model is often more difficult and time consuming than the reconstruction model. Through the first few years many critics of the war have written off the developmental strategy in Iraq as a failure because there was not immediate success. However, elements of reconstruction were implemented in the nation-building efforts, such as allowing ex-Baathists to hold office in the newly formed government. Could the mix of strategies be a sign of slow growth? As in other examples, it is not until intervention is complete that a conclusion can be made about the overall success or failure of the intervention.

Afghanistan

The biggest foundational issue faced in Afghanistan is that few of the elements needed for a modern economy are in place, creating a Mobius Strip for rebuilding efforts which leads countries right back to where
they began (Etzioni 2004). The factors for economic reconstruction have simply not been met. The elements within economic reconstruction are the accumulation of goods and capital, supportive institutions, transportation, productive labor, and effective communication of knowledge (Etzioni 2004).

The majority of ethnic groups in Afghanistan live in compact rural areas that have a demand for local government (Shahrani 2002). As a result, a relationship between the state and its citizens was never fully formulated. Whether or not Afghanistan would break off into different regions by competing warlords was a legitimate concern (Starr 2006). The state thrived for legitimacy and it became difficult for outside influences to rebuild or create a new governmental structure not recognized by many citizens (Shahrani 2002).

One problem in the struggles in Afghanistan was a lack of American troop commitment following the Iraq War and 9/11. The U.S had turned its back on Afghanistan following the Soviet removal in 1989 (Goodson 2006). President George W. Bush decided to focus most of the regional specialists on the occupation of Iraq. The mantra of the administration at the time was to ‘win the War on Terror’ instead of ‘commit to nation-building in Afghanistan’. The light footprint of American forces in Afghanistan was shown to be extremely problematic in the first foundation on nation-building: security (Goodson 2006). It wasn’t until the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took over security operation in 2003 that the threat level began decreasing.

In December 2001, the Bonn Accords were set up by parties, inside and outside Afghanistan, as timetables for state-building efforts. (Goodson 2006). Many believe that a similar system of transitional goals delayed the transition in Iraq (Goodson 2006). This led to a successful presidential election in 2005, which in turn garnered political parties, a key factor in the success of sovereignty in nation-building (Goodson 2006). For many, Afghanistan is seen as a reconstruction as efforts are made to return to a post-Soviet, pre-Taliban era with small success stories along the way. Could switching strategies to complete redevelopment help the effort in Afghanistan?

Haiti

In comparison, the United States reconstruction strategy in Haiti in 1994 was seen as a near total failure. Haiti has become an example that even though the “nation” shares a homogenous identity, it does not guarantee a legitimacy of a state (Ottaway 2002). The first problem faced was the American public's divided attitude on the mission. Political and domestic support is a popular factor for the success or failure of nation-building (Pei et. al 2006). Then, the United States-led Multinational Military Force (MNF) gave military control of the Haiti mission to the United Nations-led United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), only six months
after initial intervention, due to a lack of domestic support (Pei et. al 2006). The foundation of security was never met in the Haiti case as the UNMIH considered police work to be out of their range, and in turn violence spread causing civic institutions and proper election to disappear (Pei et. al 2006). This supports the theory that without one of the foundations of nation-building the other areas are bound to fail.

The Haitian leader Aristide and his regime also stunted the economic growth of Haiti during the recovery period. The US and it’s international partners donated money towards the Haiti effort but the corruption of Aristide’s privatized economy stunted growth. This lack of cooperation led to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to be the primary aid for Haiti, which proved difficult to coordinate with the U.S. (Pei et. al 2006). Therefore the factors for Haiti’s failure are as such: lack of internal domestic U.S. support, poor planning, and handing policing operations over to the UN too quickly. If the U.S stayed longer with greater focus could it have ended differently? This seems to confirm the ‘18 Effect’ of the deadbeat parents and the runaway child. However, a closer look is needed to see if this is in fact the case.

Germany and Japan

The success of nation-building in Germany and Japan after WWII relied on the strategy of redevelopment and other factors that have not been seen since the post-WWII era. First, post-war occupation of Japan lasted seven years and in Germany, four years. Of course, the U.S still stations troops in both countries today with the permission of both countries. In these cases the U.S. and its allies were able to control foreign relations and aide before relinquishing control to the newly formed states (Etzioni 2004). Unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, there was no danger that these countries would break into a civil war amongst ethnicities.

On the economic front, the Marshall Plan allowed Germany and the Allies a chance to recover quickly and embrace the newly demilitarized country. In 1948, The Marshall Plan totaled 13 percent of the U.S. budget, compared to today where the U.S. spends roughly one percent of its budget on foreign aide (Etzioni 2004). Newly formed institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration flexed their power and allowed Germany and the Allies to import the tools for recovery (Dobbins et. al 2003).

In Japan, the United States took a more unilateral approach to the redevelopment effort. The U.S. over-prepared for the demilitarization of the Japanese army and was surprised the Japanese folded so quickly (Dobbins et. al 2003). On the civic front, Douglas MacArthur and the SCAP administration quickly took control of Japanese bureaucracies and decentralized the power structure after the decision to remove Emperor
Hirohito (Dobbins et. al 2003). MacArthur ended the powerful corporate zaibatsu leaders opening the way for more business and economic development (Dobbins et. al 2003).

**The Homogeneity Myth**

A common excuse many scholars use in explaining the success of Germany and Japan as compared to the hardships of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Haiti in nation-building is that because of the homogenous makeup of the people in Germany and Iraq, they were more conductive to nation-building efforts. This argument states that because the German and Japanese simply wanted to be redeveloped and all the citizens embraced intervention that the proper measures of success fell in line. This is a common myth associated with defining success and the “18 Effect” offers a better explanation for success.

If the myth of the homogenous culture were to be true, then all cases of nation-building with a majority homogenistic society would be successful because everyone would be on the same page. Comparatively, all heterogeneous attempts at nation-building would be unsuccessful. This study shows that Haiti was indeed a homogenous society, before and after intervention, and it became one of the best examples of a failed nation-building attempt. Also, Germany and Japan are more diverse than people credit them with being. In about 50 years, the Germanic people went from divided territories within the country to an unsuccessful democracy in the Weimar Republic and then to Nazi rule. Therefore, in the case of Germany not only are the people not exactly homogenous, they also have had failed attempts at democracy, just years before American intervention in nation-building.

Therefore, a better model should be looked at in determining why Germany and Japan were successful. Why didn’t the U.S. use the lessons learned in Germany and Japan in Afghanistan, Haiti, and Iraq? According to James Dobbins, it appears those instances were too far in the past. That is why this paper is important in identifying these factors for future ventures in nation-building. The U.S. shut itself off for a good portion of the Cold War and international peacekeeping became the go-to for maintaining ceasefires and peace (Dobbins 2006). Coordination and communications became major problems for nation-building efforts for the U.S. in Haiti in the 1990s. The culture of the Arab nations and Islamic territorialism became something in which the U.S. was found to be inexperienced. The Bush administration tried to model Iraq after the successes of Germany and Japan (Dobbins 2006).

**Hypothesis**

In order to decide if the “18 Effect” model is proper in determining success it is necessary to formulate a hypothesis test of the theory. The
purpose is to test the vague conceptualization of what actually has happened in the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, Germany, and Japan. The test will explore whether or not the U.S. met the qualifications for the four foundations for success in nation-building, and at what times during intervention this occurred. In the “18 Effect” theory the dependent variable (the variable to be explained) is success in nation-building. The independent variables (the explanatory variable) are length of intervention and type of nation-building (parenting strategy).

Hypothesis Test
Independent Variables (I.V.) | Dependent Variables (D.V.)
--- | ---
I.V. 1: Length of Intervention | D.V. 1: Political Freedom
I.V. 2: Type of Nation-Building | D.V. 2: Military and Civilian Casualties
 | D.V. 3: GDP Growth Rate

In the theory, time is trying to be explained as the reason whether or not the attempt will be successful. In the hypothesis test, several factors are being broken down to conclude whether or not the length on intervention was a salient effort. In this case, the dependent variable remains to be the success of the nation-building effort. The test will look at the four foundations of nation-building as determinants of success. For the politics and social foundations, the test will look at polity scores and aggregate data that conclude the level of political freedoms in the five cases pre-, post-, and after intervention. For economics, the test looks at economic GDP growth during the same time period. For security, the test looks at military and civilian casualties in the same time period.

As level of political freedoms rise, the number of military deaths decline, and as GDP growth increases, the more successful the strategy and intervention length has become. As political freedoms decline, military deaths increase, and GDP growth decreases, the less successful the strategy and intervention length has become.

The results of the hypothesis test will determine whether or not the argument of the “18 Effect” has any validity.

Research Design

This leads to concluding what are the best determinants of meeting the four foundations. The aggregate data for politics and socialization measuring political freedoms that will be employed is the Polity IV Project scores and Freedom House. According to their website, the Polity score “...examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of governance. (Marshall 2011).” The research collected is mathematically coded into a ratio and assigns values to a spectrum of democratic levels.
The score ranges from -10 for a complete autocracy where a small group holds all the institutional power, to a +10 where the country is described as a fully realized representative democracy. This score is important in describing where each country is at in its history of U.S. intervention and it measures whether or not power is concentrated in the system.

Freedom House is a rating system based on tracking political and civil liberties in every country where data is available. According to the FreedomHouse.org website, the ratings process is based on a checklist of "10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions." These questions are in categories such as "electoral processes, political pluralism, functionality, freedom of belief, and rule of law" to name a few. The countries are then assigned a political rights score and civil liberties score based from one (highest) to seven (lowest). Looking at the results, the higher the number the less political freedom the country has. Therefore as the numbers decrease over time, the level of political freedoms increase. Using both the Polity IV score and the Freedom House score will determine whether or not the political and social foundations were met in the cases of U.S. nation-building.

To determine whether or not the economics foundation was met GDP growth will be examined. According to CIA World Factbook, the gross domestic product of a country is the value of all good produced inside a country and is seen as a standard for living. Looking at GDP growth instead total GDP will tell a better story of the country’s economic status pre-intervention compared to what happened after withdrawal.

For the security foundation, military and civilian casualties will be looked at in Iraq and Afghanistan during intervention to add support to the “18 Effect”.

Results
Iraq

http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

According to the Polity IV score for Iraq, the pre-intervention level of 2003 saw the lowest score ever for Iraq at around -9.5. Immediately following intervention and the fall of Saddam, levels shot up to an all time high around
one to two points on the Polity IV scale. Around 2005, Iraq’s democracy rating leveled off.

*Freedom House Scores: Iraq*

[www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)

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The Freedom House data shows a similar conclusion, as pre-intervention levels show low Political Freedom (PF) and Civil Liberties (CL) scores. Towards the end of the highest U.S. influence, the Freedom House scores improve. The score ranges from sevens on both civil liberties and political freedoms to fives and sixes in 2010. Therefore as influence decreases in Iraq, the better the Iraqi citizens are doing. This can be seen as a good sign that the U.S. is realizing that Iraq is improving.

However, this can also be seen as sort of adoption. Iraq has shown to be worse off democratically when it governs itself. The U.S. occupation can be an adoption where new parents arrive and immediately the child is better off. The international perception of the U.S. occupation often times appear as though the U.S. is going in to “steal” the child from their original parents. The moral question appears as to whether or not this is justified if the child is better off with the new parents.

![Iraq Economic Growth](http://medienkritik.typepad.com/blog/2005/07/economic_quagmi.html)

Iraq GDP growth also shows an increase during intervention in
2003. The growth was declining since 1997, and the 2003 and beyond level was not dramatically different. Perhaps the problem left in Iraq is a fiscal one, as the child cannot find a job that pays enough money to move out on its own. Also, the U.S. and U.N. ended their economic sanctions on Iraq.

**U.S. Troop Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq**


On the security front, military casualties dramatically rose during the initial occupation in 2003. Over the following years, the level remained until the peak surge in 2007. As influence in the region diminished in 2008, troop deaths decreased. Like the signs from the political arena, this is a good sign that because security improved, U.S. attention in the region declined, promoting a level of maturity and confidence in Iraq as attention turned towards Afghanistan.

**Afghanistan**

Afghanistan, on the other hand, saw a steady level of military casualties from 2001-2008 as attention was being paid to Iraq. When the focus shifted to Afghanistan in 2008, Afghanistan actually overtook Iraq in troop death levels. In the following year, deaths again declined. Things have not appeared much better in Afghanistan, leading to the conclusion that domestic issues and other foreign conflicts have taken U.S. attention away from the region. This shows that U.S. involvement in Afghanistan has been less successful for Afghan maturity because the U.S. has not been an involved parent.
Adding more evidence to this conclusion is Afghanistan’s Polity IV Score. After U.S. intervention, Afghanistan saw no increase or decrease in governance, staying around the -9 score range.

*Freedom House Scores: Afghanistan:*

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Afghanistan’s Freedom House score shows a success in liberties following the Bonn Accords’ successful elections, but a trend downward after 2009, a period where U.S. intervention would be needed most, but perhaps willingness is lacking.

*Afghanistan GDP Real Growth Rate*


Afghanistan’s economic recovery was a different story. Following intervention in 2001, GDP growth went from negative growth to a drastic
increase. This shows that Afghanistan is the child whose parents are never around, yet somehow the child is making money, possibly by drugs, and in the case of Afghanistan: opium.

Haiti

Haiti’s Polity IV shows a drastic increase following U.S. intervention in 1994 followed by a leveling off in the next five years. However, following U.S. removal of attention towards the Haiti mission, levels dropped off significantly, but were still higher than pre-intervention levels.

*Freedom House Scores: Haiti*

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Haiti’s Freedom House Score also shows an increase in liberties following intervention, and a decrease as the U.S. influence lessened. Haiti’s economic growth shows that GDP spiked upon intervention and leveled off and declined in the years to come. Haiti became a case of failed nation-building. It can become a classic example of how leaving your child (or country) before full maturation can lead to disaster when they are on their own. The U.S. was not fully ready to hand Haiti over to the U.N. and therefore it caused chaos in the life of the country. This is similar to things
going well in the life of a child and then calamity striking right before maturity, where then instead of success, the child reverts back to adolescent ways.

**Germany & Japan**

Now it is time to compare these cases with two cases of known successes: Germany and Japan.

In both Germany and Japan, the countries’ Polity IV score rose to the highest score possible in the years after WWII. These scores have never faltered. On the economic front, both countries’ GDP growth also grew similarly, although in the past 40 years, the rate of growth have decreased and steadied. These two cases show that all the proper foundations for maturity were met before U.S. intervention was over and U.S. removal was a sign of success in these cases.

**Conclusion**

It is easy from the outside looking in to step back and compare nation-building to the parent/child relationship. Both relationships have an outside force taking responsibility for another entity where society will place the success or blame on the parent. A lot of emphasis in nation-building
and parenthood is placed on what the “adult” does, which leads to “the U.S. having the responsibility of being a police for the world”. Attention and parenting strategy play a very important role in maturity. But, according to the data, is the “18 Effect” and the four foundations (checkpoints) of nation-building the best way to measure maturity in these countries?

**Impacted Nation-Building Foundation: Result of U.S. “Parenting”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Politics/Social</th>
<th>Security</th>
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According to the results, in all cases but Afghanistan the “18 Effect” model gives a good explanation to the outcome of the intervention. Afghanistan showed little change or impact in any of the foundations in comparison to the other cases.

The model of parenting can be something the United States looks to in future attempts. How does one become a good parent in nation-building? As difficult as the occupation in Iraq was and continues to be, the results show that the Iraqi people are making progress towards maturity in all areas. Iraq has been the U.S.’ troubled teen. Would it be wrong for the U.S. to keep attention on Iraq for a little longer? Regardless of what situation they encounter the child in, the results show the U.S. must fulfill all aspects of attention, education, security, and economic support to help ensure future
cases will reach maturity and free will.

Bibliography


