Global Americanization: The Effects of United States Military Operations on Global Political Rights and Civil Liberties

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"Safeguarding the rights of others is the most noble and beautiful end of a human being."
-Kahlil Gibran

Globalization has often been called the Westernization, or even the Americanization, of the world (Steger 101). This is due to a variety of sources of globalization including the expansion of capitalism, which spreads American goods throughout the world, the rise of multi-national corporations, and the global spread of democracy. If globalization is synonymous with Americanization, and democracy is one of the defining characteristics of America, it should hold true that democracy is being spread and accepted throughout the global community. Democracy can be spread through two main policies: diplomacy and military intervention, with intervention being the most direct and forceful means. Therefore, it should hold true that United States Military Operations (USMOs) directly correlate with global levels of freedom.

After its independence from Great Britain, the United States practiced a policy of isolationism. Before the United States Civil War, it had only engaged in territory battles with the Indian tribes and Mexico. Following the Civil War and Reconstruction, America started to come out of its isolation: “it started to construct a formidable navy and simultaneously began to push its weight around in the Caribbean and Pacific. In 1898 it provoked a conflict with Spain over Cuba and…[established] colonial rule in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines” (Cameron 5). It was not until World War I that the United States truly stepped into the global arena as a major power. Congress reluctantly declared war on Germany in 1917 at the insistence of President Woodrow Wilson. The United States’ involvement in WWI made for a decisive allied victory and transformed it into a leading international player. A little over two decades after WWI, the United States was attacked by the Empire of Japan at Pearl Harbor and America entered World War II, declaring war on Japan. A subsequent declaration of war on America was made by Germany and the United States soon faced a two-front war. WWII would be the defining event marking the United States’ presence as an international superpower (Cameron 6-7). Moments after the attack on Pearl Harbor, “Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto is credited with saying…’I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve’” (Wikipedia contributors, “Isoroku Yamamoto's sleeping giant quote”). It appears Isoroku was terribly correct; American involvement in WWII led to another decisive allied victory in both Europe and Japan and awoke a giant that would never again be laid to rest.

Since the end of WWII, the United States has unofficially adopted a policy very similar to that reflected by the quote at the beginning of this paper: it became the responsibility of the United States to protect and spread democracy, thereby aiding...
individuals around the world. The end of WWII saw the dawn of the use of nuclear power and the rise of the Cold War.

In the sense of the name, this was a war unlike any other the world had ever seen. It not only posed the constant threat of nuclear warfare, it was a war against an ideological enemy: communism. Communism was the biggest threat American democracy had ever faced. It created national panic not only for the state of international affairs, but also for the state of affairs at home. In the early 1950s the United States faced what became known as McCarthyism. McCarthyism can best be defined as a combination of a “witch-hunt and anti-communist hysteria” in which Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy led investigations into communist activity in various aspects of American life, including but not limited to theatre, the media, literature, and the military (Simkin). My father, Les Lively, lived through and remembers the Cold War very vividly. As I was formulating my thesis, I discussed the Cold War and McCarthyism with him and he was able to share his memories, including the following: “It was a combination of an irrational fear and a weird nationalism. Nobody really knew what they were afraid of”. Then in October of 1962, the United States came face-to-face with “the one moment when the Cold War came closest to escalating into a nuclear war”: the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Soviet Union placed nuclear missiles in Cuba, easily within range of the United States (Wikipedia contributors, “Cuban Missile Crisis”).

Perhaps stemming from these fears, the United States set out on a mission to not only stop the spread of communism, but to extend the presence of democracy. This was the full embodiment of President Woodrow Wilson’s petition to Congress for a declaration of war before World War I:

The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them. (Sixty-Fifth Congress, 1 Session, Senate Document No. 5)

This begins a series of United States Military Operations that will be defined by this desire to make the world safe for democracy. These USMOs all attempt to have a positive impact on global freedom. Some succeed, allowing for improvements in the freedom of the target country. Others fail, causing declines in freedom. Of course, others have no real impact. Hypothetically, there should be defining characteristics of the USMO that determine its success.

Hypotheses and Empirical Data Concerning United States Military Operations

In order to analyze the operations, I used a dataset put together by LaGrange College Assistant Professor of Political Science, Dr. John Tures, and several LaGrange College students using Freedom House data. The dataset, entitled “Operation Exporting Freedom: The Quest for Democratization via United States Military Operations” by Dr. John A. Tures, provides several different variables relating to the USMOs, including the country’s freedom ratings and change in freedom from pre-USMO to post-USMO. The dataset determines freedom on two different levels, political rights and civil liberties, and
then classifies the country as “free”, “partly free”, or “not free”. In order to have an improvement in freedom, the country’s political rights and civil liberties must show enough improvement to change the country’s freedom category (i.e. moving from “not free” before the USMO to “partly free” after the USMO). In order for a decline in freedom to occur, the country’s political rights and civil liberties must decline enough to move the country into a lower freedom category (i.e. moving from “partly free” before the USMO to “not free” after the USMO). The variables which I considered to be most relevant to changes in freedom, and therefore which I focused on more than others are: the duration of the USMO in years, the region in which the USMO occurred, the type of intervention, whether or not there was actual combat, and whether or not the target country consented to the USMO. Initially, I believed combat and consent would be the most significant variables, therefore having the greatest effect on the success or failure of the operation. I hypothesized that most operations that resulted in an improvement in freedom would not have involved combat, and most operations that resulted in a decline in freedom would have involved combat. I also believed that operations that resulted in an improvement in freedom would have involved the full consent of the target country. On the other hand, operations that resulted in a decline in freedom would have involved no consent from the target country. As far as the other variables, the duration of the USMO was not an actual variable in the dataset, but could easily be figured by subtracting the beginning year from the end year. I believed that operations that lasted for a short amount of time would result in an improvement in freedom, and operations that lasted a long amount of time would result in a decline in freedom. I did not think region and type of intervention would be as significant, but still have some effect. I hypothesized that USMOs would be least successful in communist or former-USSR countries and most successful in Europe and countries that were already transitioning toward democracy. I also believed that (in conjunction with the lack of combat) humanitarian missions and other forms of aid would be most likely to result in an improvement in freedom and that operations involving combat (i.e. conventional ground operations or air strikes) would be most likely to result in a decline in freedom.

**Data for cases that resulted in an improvement in the freedom of the target country**

In order to determine frequencies, I put the data from “Operation Exporting Freedom: The Quest for Democratization via United States Military Operations” into the computer program, SPSS. I was then able to analyze each variable and determine the most commonly occurring category of the variable. I found that the largest amount of operations resulting in an improvement in freedom last less than a year. Beyond the 1 year mark, the number of successes decreases up until eight years when there is a large, unexplainable spike; however, it can still be said that the greatest chance of success occurs when the USMO is completed in under a year. Most of the USMOs resulting in an improvement in freedom occurred in the Americas, followed by Europe. Only one successful USMO has occurred in the Middle East and there have been no success in Central Asia or the Australia/Pacific Islands region. The two most common types of intervention that result in an improvement in freedom are monitoring operations and interdictions, or operations to prohibit a certain action. None of the operations that have resulted in an improvement have been hostage rescues, naval support operations, commando strikes, air support operations, searches, or non-conventional ground operations. Also, an overwhelming majority of successful cases did not involve combat.
Finally, the majority of successful cases involved full consent from the target; however, a large percentage of successful involved only partial consent or no consent at all.

The following chart shows the mean, mode, and standard deviation for all variables in operations involving an improvement in freedom.

**Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>duration</th>
<th>yrs</th>
<th>region</th>
<th>TypeofIntervention</th>
<th>Combat</th>
<th>TargetConsent</th>
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<td>35</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
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<td>1.514</td>
<td>5.344</td>
<td>.382</td>
<td>.838</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Data for cases that resulted in a decline in the freedom of the target country**

I used the same program and dataset in order to analyze the variables for operations that result in a decline in freedom. I found that, similar to the cases that resulted in an improvement in freedom, most cases that resulted in failure lasted under a year and the chance of failure as time went on decreased from there. Unlike the cases that resulted in improvement, there is no large spike in the percentage in longer operations. Most failures have occurred in the Americas and Central Asia, followed by the Middle East and Africa. There have been very few failures in Europe and only one in Australia and the Pacific Islands. Most of the operations that resulted in a decline in freedom were humanitarian relief operations, followed by evacuations, monitoring, and interdictions. None of the operations that ended in a decline in freedom were operations to support an Air Force base, mine removal operations, joint military operations, air strikes, border control operations, or military exercises. Also similar to the improvement cases, an overwhelming majority of successful cases did not involve combat. Finally, a large majority of unsuccessful cases involved full consent from the target while only 27% involved partial consent or no consent at all. This shows that more cases that resulted in a decline in freedom had the target’s full consent than did cases that resulted in an improvement in freedom.

The following chart shows the mean, mode, and standard deviation for all variables in operations that resulted in a decline in freedom.

**Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>duration</th>
<th>yrs</th>
<th>region</th>
<th>TypeofIntervention</th>
<th>Combat</th>
<th>TargetConsent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>3.51</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1(a)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>5.948</td>
<td>1.938</td>
<td>3.066</td>
<td>.417</td>
<td>.803</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

Analysis of Results

The statistical data proved several of my hypotheses wrong; however, there are several interesting trends to be noted. Originally, I believed that operations that lasted for a short amount of time would result in an improvement in freedom, and operations that lasted a long amount of time would result in a decline in freedom. This did not hold up to empirical tests. While the majority of operations that resulted in an improvement in freedom lasted under a year, an even greater percentage of operations that resulted in a decline in freedom also lasted under a year. Furthermore, an unexplainable spike (a total of seven out of 35 operations) occurs at the eight year mark for successful operations. These cases include Panama (1991-1999), Brazil (1996-2004), the Dominican Republic (1996-2004), etc. One possible explanation for this is that the dataset ends in 2004; therefore, any USMO beginning in 1996 (there are several) will have lasted eight years in 2004 if it has not yet been completed, but still show improvements in freedom. Six of the seven USMOs that lasted for eight years fall into this category.

Region seemed to have much more significance than I expected, whether it is a real significance or not. I hypothesized that USMOs would be least successful in communist or former-USSR countries and most successful in Europe and countries that were already transitioning toward democracy. This held to be somewhat true. Most USMOs that ended in an improvement in freedom occurred in the Americas and Europe. These were primarily countries that had unstable democracy, but some were already democratic or transitioning to become democratic. Examples of countries that fall into the European or American regions and showed improvement are Panama, Honduras, Mexico, Bosnia, and Yugoslavia.

I also believed that humanitarian missions and other forms of aid would be most likely to result in an improvement in freedom and that operations involving combat (i.e. conventional ground operations or air strikes) would be most likely to result in a decline in freedom. The two forms of interventions that were most commonly seen in cases that resulted in an improvement in freedom are monitoring operations (such as monitoring a cease fire) and interdictions, but neither one made up an overwhelming percentage of improvement cases. At the same time, the majority of cases that ended in a decline in freedom were humanitarian missions, the opposite of what I had hypothesized. An equal number of conventional ground operations ended in an improvement as in a decline in freedom, and one non-conventional ground operation ended in a decline in freedom as opposed to none that ended in an improvement. The only air strike that fell into one of these two categories ended in an improvement in freedom.

Initially, I believed combat and consent would be the most significant variables, therefore having the greatest effect on the success or failure of the operation. Instead, these two variables seemed to have the least significance. I hypothesized that most operations that resulted in an improvement in freedom would not have involved combat, and most operations that resulted in a decline in freedom would have involved combat. In reality, the majority of USMOs that resulted in an improvement, as well as the majority of USMOs that resulted in a decline, did not involve combat. Only a slightly higher percentage of USMOs resulting in an improvement did not involve combat.
I also believed that operations that resulted in an improvement in freedom would have involved the full consent of the target country. On the other hand, operations that resulted in a decline in freedom would have involved no consent from the target country. This, like the presence of combat, did not hold true. The majority of USMOs resulting in either an improvement in freedom or a decline in freedom involved the full consent of the target country.

What does all this mean? My hypotheses were incorrect. None of the variables seem to have a significant impact on whether or not a United States Military Operation will result in an improvement in freedom or a decline in freedom one way or the other, besides perhaps the region in which the target country is located. Is the fact that there is a higher rate of improvement in some regions and a higher rate of decline in others merely a coincidence, or is there actual significance to the region? I believe that question is best left to further analytical research purely concerning regional data. I can say, for certain, that the operations resulting in an improvement in freedom and the operations resulting in a decline in freedom have very similar characteristics: most do not involve combat, involve the full consent of the target country, last less than one year, etc. This leads me to believe that there is no way to predict the success of a military operation in advance. There are no variables which signify that the operation will result in an improvement as opposed to a decline in freedom, or vice versa.

Case Studies

Based on what I saw from the empirical data, I decided to look at two cases that resulted in an improvement and two others that resulted in a decline in freedom. For the improvement in freedom, I chose Operation Coronet Oak which occurred in Panama from 1977 to 1999 and Operation Determined Guard which occurred in Yugoslavia from 1996 and was still ongoing as of 2004. I chose these operations because the improvement in freedom was so significant; Panama and Yugoslavia went from a not free status to a free status, whereas most countries that showed an improvement in freedom only moved from not free to partly free or from partly free to free (Tures).

Operation Coronet Oak is continuing mission to this day; however, Panama’s involvement in the mission ended in 1999 and the mission was relocated to Puerto Rico. The operation had originally belonged to the active Air Force since 1962, but in October 1977 the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and National Guard took over. “The Coronet Oak mission featured embassy resupply, support of U.S. troops and the Drug Enforcement Agency, medical evacuation and alert missions” (GlobalSecurity.org, “Coronet Oak”). The main purpose of the operation was to fly C-130 aircrafts over Panama, searching for drug traffickers and seize potential drug smugglers (this is classified in the Tures dataset as an interdiction because the purpose was to prohibit drug trafficking/smuggling). The operation was based out of Howard Air Force Base and “Air Guard units from across the United States rotated through the air base every two weeks to keep the mission going” (GlobalSecurity.org, “Coronet Oak”). As mentioned above, the operation is still ongoing but has moved to Puerto Rico. “The closing of the Coronet Oak mission is part of a series of events in which the Republic of Panama will take possession of all former U.S. military bases and the Panama Canal as part of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977” (GlobalSecurity.org, “Coronet Oak”).

As I have already stated, I chose this operation because of the large increase in freedom. It is important to note the variables in this case in order to compare it to the
majority of the improvement cases, as well as the decline case that will be examined later. First, the operation lasted for 22 years, much longer than most of the operations that resulted in an improvement in freedom. Second, Panama is in the Americas just like the majority of successful cases. The type of intervention seen here was an interdiction, the second most common type of intervention in all cases ending in an improvement. Finally, there was no combat in this operation, and Panama had partially consented to it. Although this operation does not necessarily fall into the majority of all variables in cases that resulted in an improvement, it is important to remember that there is no one variable that determines whether or not a case will be successful; in fact, the only variable that seems to have any significance is region, and Panama falls into the Americas which is the majority region for improvement cases.

The next example of a USMO that resulted in an improvement in freedom is Operation Determined Guard. Operation Determined Guard began in December 1996. U.S. Naval Forces, NATO, and the Western European Union conducted a joint effort to enforce UN sanctions in Yugoslavia. Although the United States pulled out of the operation in 1998, Mediterranean and NATO forces still continue to operate in the former Yugoslavia (GlobalSecurity.org, “Operation Determined Guard”). As of 2004, the freedom ratings had improved from not free to free. As with Operation Coronet Oak, it is important to consider how the empirical variables from earlier in this research relate to this operation. Operation Determined Guard lasted eight years (as of 2004). This is where the spike in the data occurs. Yugoslavia is in Europe, the second most common region for success. This is considered to be a monitoring mission, the most common type of intervention for all operations that result in an improvement in freedom. This operation did not involve combat, also overwhelmingly common to operations that result in an improvement. Finally, Yugoslavia did not give its consent to Operation Determined Guard. This is not most common to the improvement cases, but it is the second most common. Operation Determined Guard is nearly the epitome of an operation resulting in an improvement in freedom; it fits into the most frequently occurring, or second most frequently occurring, category for all variables in this field.

Next I will discuss two cases that resulted in a decline in freedom: the Vietnam War and the Iran Hostage Crisis. My criteria for picking these two cases are different from that of the improvement cases because there are no decline cases that move from a free status to a not free status. Instead, I picked the Vietnam War and the Iran Hostage Crisis for their significance; both were defining moments in American history.

United States involvement in Vietnam began “after the former colonial master in Vietnam, France, pulled out in 1954 after losing the battle of Dien Bien Phu to the northern, communist, national liberation army (NLA)” (Cameron 9). Then in 1955, Vietnam became divided into a communist north and a free south, as determined at an international conference. Eventually, the communist guerillas or the Vietcong, as they were called by the United States, became more influential and started gaining power in the south. At this point, President John F. Kennedy, and later President Lyndon B. Johnson, began to increase the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam in fear that the communists would take over South Vietnam and eventually Southeast Asia (9). By 1964 the Vietnam War had begun. By the late 1960s, national turmoil ensued. It looked as though the United States was fighting a loosing battle and Americans were becoming restless, engaging in protests and anti-war demonstrations. In 1968, Richard Nixon was
elected president with the promise that he would pull American troops out of Vietnam. “He sent his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, to negotiate a peace agreement with North Vietnam, while simultaneously and secretly widening the war to neighboring Cambodia”. Meanwhile, anti-war demonstrations and other forms of opposition continued in America. Finally, the war ended in 1973 with the defeat of the U.S. and South Vietnam forces (10).

Due to the fact that “Operation Exporting Freedom: The Quest for Democratization via United States Military Operations” does not contain data for any USMO that started before 1970, there is no data for the Vietnam War. However, there are several obvious variables. For example, the operation obviously lasted for nine years, an uncommonly long operation as compared to others that ended in a decline in freedom. Furthermore, the dataset classifies Vietnam as being in the East Asia region in other operations, also not common to operations that ended in a decline. We know for a fact that this was military aid to South Vietnam and it involved combat, which, just like the previous variable, is not common to operations that ended in a decline.

The next example of a USMO that resulted in a decline in freedom is the Iran Hostage Crisis, more specifically, Operation Eagle Claw. On November 4, 1974, a group of “Iranian students calling themselves the Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam…seized the main (United States) embassy building” (Wikipedia Contributors, “Iran Hostage Crisis”). This action came after Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, called upon Iranians to protest U.S. and Israeli interests, as well as the U.S. admittance and asylum of the former Iranian Shah. Initially, Ayatollah Khomeini claimed he had no knowledge of the plan to overtake the embassy, yet he praised the students for their actions. It was later learned that he had been informed of their plans a day in advance. “Out of 90 occupants, 66 were taken captive…Fourteen women, African Americans and non-US captives were soon released, leaving 52 who remained captive until their release in January 1981” (Wikipedia Contributors, “Iran Hostage Crisis”). As in any hostage situation, the Iranian captors made demands on the United States, which the Carter administration, of course, refused to meet. “(They) demanded that the U.S. government apologize for its interference in the internal affairs of Iran and for the overthrow of Prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq. They also demanded that Iran's assets in the U.S. be released. The money had been frozen by the U.S. government in response to the hostage taking” (Wikipedia Contributors, “Iran Hostage Crisis”).

Operation Eagle Claw, which lasted for six months in 1980, is the actual operation planned to rescue the hostages. The first attempt met great failure when the majority of the aircrafts involved were damaged in a sandstorm resulting in the death or injury of several U.S. airmen. The aircrafts were modified in order to make a second attempt, but when a demonstration of the aircrafts resulted in yet another crash, the operation was deserted (Wikipedia Contributors, “Iran Hostage Crisis”).

As with the other examples, the variables of this operation must be examined. Operation Eagle Claw lasted under one year, the most common duration of all cases that resulted in a decline in freedom. Also, Iran is in the Middle East, the third most common region for a decline in freedom. This operation was a hostage rescue, not common to operations that end in decline, but also not common to USMOs in general. No combat was involved, which is overwhelmingly true of operations that result in a decline. Finally,
Iran did not consent to the intervention, which is not common in decline cases (approximately 20% of all decline cases involve no consent from the target country).

Several conclusions can be drawn from these case studies. First of all, as had already been determined, not all operations that result in an improvement are similar, just as not all operations that result in a decline are similar. Furthermore, there are several similarities between operations that result in an improvement and those that result in a decline. These two statements were visible from the empirical analysis. If the variables covered by the empirical analysis do not seem to have much significance, there must be some other characteristic of USMOs that can lead to the success or failure of the operation. I believe this can be somewhat determined by the case studies, particularly by the operations that resulted in a decline in freedom.

The major difference between the operations that resulted in an improvement in freedom and those that resulted in a decline in freedom is the domestic response to the operation. Neither Operation Coronet Oak nor Operation Determined Guard were well known or highly publicized. Therefore, United States civilians paid little to no attention to these operations. On the other hand, both the Vietnam War and the Iran Hostage Crisis (Operation Eagle Claw) were very highly publicized and the media frequently drew attention to the cases. Americans were very unhappy with the progress of both operations. Many Americans were discouraged by the 48,000 killed and 300,000 wounded in Vietnam, and the nation became divided (Cameron 9). Domestic opposition to the war is quite possibly the reason President Johnson did not run for re-election in 1968. The domestic opposition could have helped shorten the war in Vietnam, forcing the United States to accept defeat; however, it also could have been one of the leading contributors that kept American forces in Vietnam despite their lack of progress. “It showed that massive protests could bring about a change of policy although some argue that the protests actually lengthened the war as they inhibited American leaders from using all means (nuclear weapons, invading North Vietnam) that might have won the war” (10). Regardless of whether opposition helps or hinders foreign policy, I believe the morale of the American people played into the defeat of the Americans and South Vietnamese. When morale is low at home, it can not be expected to be high among the troops abroad, which is necessary for a victory; therefore, the opposition to the war could have been simply lowering the morale of the troops, making defeat inevitable.

The Iran Hostage Crisis is very similar. When American citizens were taken hostage in Iran, for reasons that probably were not clear to the average American civilian, everyone expected a decisive action by the Carter administration to free the hostages; however, this did not happen. To start with, the U.S. government froze all Iranian assets in the United States. Although the Iranians demanded that the assets be freed, this did not lead to the release of the hostages. It was not until Operation Eagle Claw, over five months after the hostages were taken, that a forced attempt to free the hostages was made by the military. This was also highly unsuccessful and the loss of U.S. troops during the attempt could not have helped morale. The Carter administration then turned to a series of unsuccessful economic sanctions and diplomatic negotiations. Finally, in November 1980 the opposition to Carter’s handling of the situation became terribly obvious when Carter lost re-election to Ronald Reagan. The Carter administration continued negotiations during its lame-duck period and on January 20, 1981, only minutes after Reagan’s inauguration, the hostages were released. This is further proof that domestic
opinion and morale can lead to policy changes. Perhaps the public’s opposition to the Carter administration elongated the length of the hostage period. The Iranians were able to see that they had successfully infuriated the American public enough to force the President to change his focus from U.S./Israeli relations to the hostage situation, thereby accomplishing their original goal and the longer the Iranians held the hostages, the longer Carter’s priorities would be diverted from Israel.

The two cases that resulted in an improvement in freedom are much different. Neither case, as with majority of the improvement cases, were highly publicized; therefore, the public knew very little, if anything, about these operations. For this reason, the military was able to easily accomplish its mission without distraction, taking care of its intended purpose and leaving. I believe this is the most significant difference between the cases that resulted in an improvement in freedom and those that resulted in a decline in freedom.

**What does this mean for the United States today?**

The United States is currently involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom, an operation with eight distinct goals:

- The military objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom consist of first, ending the regime of Saddam Hussein. Second, to identify, isolate and eliminate, Iraq's weapons of mass destructon. Third, to search for, to capture and to drive out terrorists from the country. Fourth, to collect intelligence related to terrorist networks. Fifth, to collect such intelligence as is related to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction. Sixth, to end sanctions and to immediately deliver humanitarian support to the displaced and to many needed citizens. Seventh, to secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people. Finally, to help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-government. (GlobalSecurity.org, “Operation Iraqi Freedom”).

Is it possible that the conclusions drawn from this research can be applied to Operation Iraqi Freedom in order to predict the outcome of the operation? Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003 and has been ongoing for over three years. It is in the Middle East, which is one of the regions where the United States has had very few operations end in an improvement in freedom; in fact there has only been one case that fits into this category. The operation has already involved combat. However, none of these variables are that significant as seen by my empirical analysis. I believe domestic response to be more significant to the success of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

After the Vietnam War, the term “Vietnam syndrome” began to spring up. This referred to the belief that “the US should never again engage in a military conflict far from home without clear, viable, political objectives, public support and an exit strategy for the military” (Cameron 10). Many Americans fear that this is exactly what the U.S. government has done. The initial reasoning provided for the invasion of Iraq was to search for weapons of mass destruction. None were found. It was later accepted that the United States should remain in Iraq in order to remove Saddam Hussein from power. That has been accomplished. It is now believed that the United States should remain involved in Iraq to put an end to insurgents and help create a stable democratic government. Many Americans subscribe to these beliefs and support U.S. involvement in
Iraq. On the other hand, many Americans believe the invasion of Iraq was never justified and opposed American involvement, pushing for the removal of U.S. troops. Based on the lessons from the Vietnam War, this could be quite detrimental to the success of the operation and has already hurt the Bush administration, causing some of the lowest approval ratings in history.

Conclusions
I originally intended this paper to prove that there is a high rate of improvements in global freedom associated with United States Military Operations abroad, thereby giving validation to the assertion that globalization is the Americanization of the world. However, the results of my research did not follow this original intention. I found that there have been more USMOs that have resulted in a decline in freedom than an improvement in freedom. I also found that there are no distinguishing factors that can determine the outcome of a USMO and be easily measured. The most significant trend which I came across was the impact of domestic support for the USMO. I saw, through case studies, that successful USMOs are those that are not highly publicized. Unsuccessful USMOs are made much more public and a great amount of domestic opposition is generated. My original hypotheses were not correct, but I was able to come across an interesting relationship between public opinion and the success of United States Military Operations.

Works Cited


